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Abstract. This paper tests the relationship between time preferences and crime rates as 
posited  by  Davis  (1988),  whose  theoretical  analysis  suggests  that  individuals’  attitude 
towards  the  future  significantly  affect  their  propensity  to  commit  crime.  Our  empirical 
analysis is based on a panel of Italian regions for the period 2002 2007. Various proxies for 
time preferences are considered: the consumer credit share out of the total amount of loans 
to households, the share of obese individuals out of the total population, and the rate of 
marriages out of the total population. In line with the theoretical prediction, our empirical 
analysis  confirms  that  where  people  are  more  impatient  and  discount  the  future  more 
heavily,  property  and  violent  crimes  are  higher.  Results  are  robust  to  a  number  of 
alternative  specifications  including  covariates  drawn  from  the  literature  on  the 
determinants of crime.  
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1. Introduction 
The Ant and the Grasshopper   an Aesopian fable which became very 
popular  just  before  the  French  Revolution     remarks  the  misfortune 
accruing  to  the  grasshopper  from  imprudence,  having  it  spent  the  warm 
months of the year singing away instead of storing up foods for the incoming 
winter. The allegory was used to give a bright description of the bourgeois 
virtues  of  hard  working  and  saving,  those  virtues  that  the  rising  class    
which would have soon taken the power   tried to attribute exclusively to 
itself.  The  bourgeois  was  depicted  as  l’honnête  homme  who  grounds  his 
success  on  both  personal  effort  and  the  awareness  that  much  patience  is 
needed before the fruits accruing from hard working and trustworthiness 
can be reaped. 
A long standing tradition in economics echoes similar arguments.  This 
tradition  emphasizes  that  the  socially  desirable  respect  of  established 
ethical codes of conduct is possible only in the presence of a proper concern 
for the future. Such a concern, however, has varied significantly over the 
centuries  and  across  cultures.  Sociologists  and  anthropologists  have  in 
recent times emphasized that the vanishing of the future is actually one of 
the  most  distinctive  features  of  modern  societies:  as  uncertainty  grows, 
individuals act as they were condemned to live an everlasting present (e.g. 
Augé, 2008). 
In the eyes of an economist, the reduced concern for the future shows up 
in the long term fall in saving rates across countries   a well established 
feature  of  modern  industrialized  societies     but  also  in  the  widespread 
tendency of the amount of (short term) debt to raise beyond what can be 
considered  a  socially  responsible  level,  as  the  recent  financial  crisis  has 
dramatically  shown.  Possibly,  even  the  recent  remarkable  increase  in 
corporate  scandals  may  be  ultimately  due  to  a  reduced  concern  for  the 
future  (coupled  with  some  institutional  changes  which  have  considerably 
affected  the  pay off  structure  faced  by  managers  and  entrepreneurs  in 
modern economies)1.  
More  generally,  there  are  grounds  to  argue  that  a  ‘life is now’ 
perspective may undermine the ethical codes of behaviour on which society 
is grounded, stimulating undesirable activities like delinquency and crime. 
Davis (1988) was the first to identify a theoretical link between crime and 
time preferences. In his words, this link finds an easy explanation in the 
fact that “the fruits of illegal activity…can be savoured before the costs of 
their acquisition must be paid” (Davis, 1988: 383). Hence, ceteris paribus, 
individuals  who  discount  the  future  more  heavily  may  be  more  prone  to 
commit crimes.  
                                                           
1 Beraldo and Turati (2011) discuss several institutional changes that may have shortened 
the agents’ time horizon. There are reasons to believe, for example, that contracts designed 
to  provide  professional  managers  adequate  monetary  incentives  in  order  to  align  their 
objectives with those of the firms’ owners may have led managers to maximise short term 
gains instead of long term profits. 3 
 
The  goal  of  this  work  is  to  provide  a  first  empirical  test  to  this 
theoretical prediction by considering both property and violent crimes. The 
main challenge is to find suitable proxies for time preferences. We focus on 
three very different measures: consumer credit, which represents short term 
debt  typically  used  by  households  to  finance  their  consumption;  obesity, 
which is linked to the intake of calories more than it is recommended by the 
consideration of future health; the willingness of individuals to engage in 
stable relationships, like the marriage. All these variables show clear trends 
in recent decades. The widespread tendency of both the amount of short 
term  debt  and  the  number  of  obese  people  to  increase,  as  well  as  the 
reduction in the willingness to engage in stable relationships, are common 
features of western industrialized countries, all of which may be (at least 
partly) related to time preferences. 
Missing micro data, our analysis is based on a panel of Italian regions 
observed over the period 2002 2007. In line with the findings of the growing 
scientific literature on crime, besides our main control for time preferences, 
we  also  include  in  the  models  a  number  of  covariates,  like  the 
unemployment  rate,  the  GDP  per  capita,  the  level  of  education,  the 
expenditure for law enforcement, the level of social capital.  
Our main results basically confirm the ‘Davis’ hypothesis’. In particular 
we  find  that  both  violent  and  property  crime  are  higher  where  people 
discount the future more heavily. This correlation is especially clear in the 
case  of  violent  crime,  mainly  when  time  preferences  are  proxied  both  by 
obesity  and  marriage  rates.  Additional  covariates  substantially  confirm 
some well established results in the literature on crime. 
The  remainder  of  the  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  In  Section  2  we 
briefly describe the theoretical model due to Davis (1988). In Section 3 we 
illustrate  our  empirical  strategy  and  our  data.  Results  are  discussed  in 
Section 4. Section 5 briefly concludes. 
 
2.  The  theoretical  framework:  time  discounting  and  attitude  to 
crime 
Following  Davis  (1988),  let  us  consider  an  individual  contemplating 
illegal activity.  If undetected she will get an income U(σ), where σ is the 
rate at which offences are committed. Suppose that the individual sees the 
future as split in two periods: in the first period she enjoys the fruits of 
illegal activity; in the second one she is possibly detected and punished. The 
individual  does  not  know  exactly  when  detection  will  occur.  However,  as 
soon as she is detected, a fine F must be paid, and   from then on   only an 
income Y accruing from some legal activity may be earned. Over an infinite 
time horizon, the expected  present value of future income, accruing from 
both legal and illegal activity can be expressed as: 
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where g(.) is the distribution of the time of detection, G(.) is the cumulative 
of  g(.)  and  r  is  the  individual  discount  rate  (summarising  the  way 
individuals discount the future).  
Let us consider now the probability of being detected within some small 
interval in the neighbourhood of t, P(.), after having breached the law up to 
t. Assuming that the chances of being detected depend only on the offence 
rate at t and on the level of enforcement E, this can be written as: 
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The individual choice problem is that of maximizing (1) subject to (2). 
This optimal control problem is greatly simplified by the fact that P(σ, E) is 
independent from time. With an infinite time horizon this implies σ to be 
constant, hence (2) can be written as a linear differential equation which 
can  be  substituted  into  (1).  Integrating  yields  a  reformulation  of  the 
objective of the agent, which is choosing σ such as to maximize: 
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The numerator of the first term on the right hand side of (3) represents 
the expected gains from crime (e.g., Becker, 1968); the denominator is the 
rate  at  which  these  gains  are  discounted.  It  is  worth  noticing  that  the 
effective discount rate is composed by the agent’s usual time preference plus 
the probability of being detected. Therefore, the rate at which offences are 
committed, σ, determines both the expected income from crime and the rate 
at which such income is discounted. 
The first order condition for a maximum, ¶V(σ,E)/¶σ = 0, imposes that 
the  usual  condition  of  equating  marginal  costs  and  benefits  must  be 
satisfied in order for the choice of σ to be optimal. Some comparative statics 
then reveals that ¶σ
 
/¶r>0 that is, agents with higher discount rates will be 
more  likely  to  commit  crime,  or,  in  other  words,  the  amount  of  crime 
committed  by  different  individuals  can  be  explained  by  their  attitudes 
toward the future. This is the theoretical prediction we aim at testing in the 
remainder of the paper. 
 
3. The empirical strategy 
We test the theoretical prediction briefly presented above by considering 
Italian regional data over the period 2002 2007. We assume that – for each 
region – data refer to a ‘representative individual’, endowed with (average) 
characteristics measured at the regional level. In particular, we consider the 
following general log log specification: 
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where Crime = {Property, Violent} is our measure of  crime, i=1,…,20 indexes 
the Italian regions, t=2002,…,2007 is the index for time, Time_pref are our 
proxies for time preferences, and X denotes a set of covariates drawn from 
the empirical literature on crime.  
We consider both property and violent crime as measured by the Italian 
National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT). In particular, the property crime 
rate  is  the  number  of  property  crimes  (like  thefts,  robberies,  frauds  and 
burglaries) per 1,000 inhabitants. The violent crime rate is the number of 
violent crimes (like rapes, homicides, kidnappings and injuries) per 10,000 
inhabitants. Grounding on Davis (1988), we expect time preferences to be 
more  important  in  the  case  of  violent  crime,  as,  given  the  level  of 
enforcement, an higher discount rate is in this case generally required for 
an action to pass a cost benefit test. 
 
3.1. Proxying time preferences 
The  main  challenge  for  our  analysis  is  to  find  proxies  for  the  time 
preferences  of  the  representative  individual  at  the  regional  level.  We 
consider three different proxies for time preferences: (i) the consumer credit 
share; (ii) the share of obese people; (iii) the marriage rate. 
 
Consumer  credit  share.  The  consumer  credit  share  is  the  most 
intuitive of such proxies. It measures the share of consumer credit out of 
total  loans  supplied  to  households.  Consumer  credit  is  a  typical  form  of 
short term debt, whereas total loans include, for instance, mortgages, that 
are  typical  long term  debts.  According  to  the  definition  provided  by  the 
Bank of Italy in its official statistics, ‘consumer credit’ includes only short 
term debts commonly financing the purchase of consumer goods, like   for 
instance   holidays or small appliances. The presumption is that the higher 
the  discount  rate     hence  the  lower  the  utility  attached  to  future 
consumption     the  higher  the  willingness  to  obtain  short term  loans  to 
increase current consumption. As the ability to obtain these types of loans 
depends also on the credit supply at the regional level, to define the variable 
Consumer Credit Share we standardize the total amount of short term debt 
by the total amount of loans supplied to households.  
As  a  simple  test  of  the  goodness  of  this  measure  to  proxy  for  time 
preferences, consider Figure 1 below. Data are taken from the 2004 Bank of 
Italy Survey on Household, Income and Wealth (SHIW). We plot short term 
debt  as  a  percentage  of  family  income  on  the  vertical  axis,  and  some 
different values of the discount rate on the horizontal axis. Data on discount 
rates are collected in the SHIW by considering the percentage of a sum of 
money available one year after the time of the interview that a particular 






Fig 1. Short term debt as a percentage of family income 
for the purchase of non durable goods 
 
Source: Our calculations on Bank of Italy-SHIW data (2004). 
 
Black bars refer to households willing to give up x% of the sum, whereas 
grey bars refer to households not willing to take up the deal. The white bars 
represent the difference between those who are willing to give up x% of the 
sum and those who are not. The Figure shows a clear positive association 
between the interest rate and the difference in the stock of short term debt 
as a percentage of family income. Intuitively, families more inclined to get 
into short term debt are also more impatient, and ask for more consumer 
credit  relative  to  less  impatient  households.  However,  Figure  1  makes  it 
clear  that     quite  obviously     consumer  credit  is  used  by  less  impatient 
households too as suggested by the few studies available on this type of loan. 
It is noteworthy that, considering European data, Magri et al. (2011) show 
that consumer credit is less widespread in Italy relative to other countries 
(multivariate analysis suggests that this type of short term debt is primarily 
used both by larger households with youngest and well educated heads, and 
by poorer households). Delinquencies (i.e., problems in repaying consumer 
credit)  are  however  higher  in  Italy  relative  to  other  countries.  They  are 
more  frequent  among  poor  households,  and  more  common  for  the 
unemployed relative to other positions. 
 
Share of obese people. The second proxy for time preferences is the 
share of obese people out of the total population. Following international 
standards, obese people are defined according to their Body Mass Index (i.e., 
BMI ≥ 30). As suggested for instance by Borghans and Golsteyn (2006), the 
link  between  BMI  and  the  individual  discount  rate  can  be  traced  by 
considering the immediate gratification of eating and the future effects of 
over eating, both in terms of physical appearance and – most importantly – 
in terms of reduced health. Again, the higher the discount rate, the lower 












2  3  5  10  20 
Discount rate (% of a sum of money families are willing to give 
up  to receive the sum immediately) 
Willing to give up the x% of the 
sum 




debt as % 
of family 
income  7 
 
current  period,  which  is  likely  to  increase  BMI.  As  before  for  consumer 
credit, the available empirical evidence highlights an association between 
BMI  and  some  measures  of  time  preferences  at  the  individual  level, 
although time preferences alone are not able to give a complete account of 
the  sharp  increase  in  the  number  of  obese  people  observed  in  many 
countries (e.g., Borghans and Golsteyn, 2006; Daly et al., 2009).  
 
Marriage rate. The third proxy for time preferences is the marriage 
rate,  defined  as  the  number  of  marriages  per  1.000  individuals.  The 
historical decline in marriage rates across industrialized countries and the 
change in marriage customs are discussed, for example, by Akerlof (1998) 
and Stevenson and Wolfers (2007). Akerlof (1998) also examines the impact 
of these changes on society at large, arguing that the observed widespread 
delay in settling down is likely to cause more crime and more substance 
abuses with adverse effects upon the subsequent generations; notice that 
this establishes a direct link between marriage customs and crime.  
To  the  best  of  our  knowledge,  only  Compton  (2009)  discusses  the 
relationship  between  heterogeneity  in  time  preferences  and  marriage 
stability,  finding  some  evidence  to  support  the  idea  that  more  patient 
individuals are less likely to divorce .  
 
Fig 2. Scatter plots for time preferences’ proxies and crime rates 
Consumer Credit Share and Obesity Rate of Marriage and Obesity
















































































Grounding  on  this  finding  we  expect  a  negative  correlation  between 
marriage rates and crime: ceteris paribus, the higher the discount rate, the 8 
 
lower the utility attached to the future, hence the willingness to enter long 
term relationships. 
Figure  2  reports  four  scatter  diagrams  to  provide  a  snapshot  of  the 
correlation  between  the  variables  used  to  proxy  for  time  preferences  (in 
logs).  Each  point  represents  an  Italian  region  in  one  particular  year.  It 
emerges a sizeable (linear) correlation between the consumer credit share 
and both the rate of marriage (r = 0.48) and the share of obese people out of 
the  total  population  (r  =  0.46).  On  the  contrary,  much  milder  is  the 
correlation between the rate of marriage and the share of obese people (r = 
0.10). Finally, a scatter plot concerning property and violent crime is also 
reported. Property and violent crimes are positively correlated. 
Figure 3 reports the geographical distribution of the variables proxying 
for  time  preferences  and  the  regional  distribution  of  both  property  and 
violent  crime.  All  the  variables  are  averaged  over  the  period  2002 2007. 
Panel  A  displays  the  regional  distribution  of  the  consumer  credit  share. 
There  is  a  clear  North South  gradient,  with  South Western  regions 
reporting the highest values and North Eastern regions reporting the lowest 
ones. A similar gradient is observable for the share of obese individuals out 
of the total population, although the picture is somewhat reversed in that 
the highest (lowest) values are achieved in South Eastern (North Western) 
regions, as Panel B shows.  
A  very  clear  picture  emerges  also  as  far  as  the  marriage  rate  is 
concerned. As Panel C shows it is generally higher in the South of Italy and 




Fig 3. Geographical distribution for time preferences’ proxies 




























Besides  the  distribution  of  the  proxies  for  time  preferences,  we  also 
consider the distribution across regions of both property and violent crimes. 
As for violent crime, Panel D suggests that there are two big areas in which 
violent crime is concentrated. The first is the North Western area including 
regions such as Lombardia, Piemonte and Emilia Romagna. The second area 
is more on the South West side of Italy and includes regions such as Lazio, 
Campania and Sicilia . A similar distribution is observable also for property 
crimes (Panel E). Also in this case higher crime rates are observable on the 
South West  side  of  Italy,  with  the  richest  Northern  regions  (Piemonte, 
Lombardia, Emilia Romagna, Toscana) having the lion’s share. 
 













3.2. Additional controls for crime 
As  additional  controls,  we  consider  a  number  of  variables  that  the 
economic  literature  on  crime  deems  to  be  important.  We  cluster  these 
additional variables into five groups: 1) current economic opportunities; 2) 
future economic opportunities; 3) education; 4) enforcement and deterrence; 
5)  social  capital.  We  discuss  each  in  turn.  Descriptive  statistics  and 
definitions are in Table A1 in the Appendix. 
 
Current  economic  opportunities.  We  measure  current  (and  past) 
economic opportunities by including in our models lagged GDP per capita 
and different measures of the unemployment rate, such as the long term 
unemployment  rate  and  the  youth  unemployment  rate.  With  regard  to 
unemployment,  some  theoretical  studies  predict  a  positive  association 
between  crime  and  unemployment,  as  the  latter  is  considered  a  variable 
reliably capturing the opportunity costs associated to crime (e.g., Freeman, 
1999;  Ehrlich,  1996,  1973).  This  hypothesis  has  found  robust  empirical 
evidence for property crime (e.g., Neumayer, 2005; Levitt, 2001; Britt, 1997; 
Reilly and Witt, 1996; Allen, 1996; Chiricos, 1987; Phillips and Votey, 1981; 
Sjoquist,  1973).  On  the  contrary,  taking  into  consideration  violent  crime, 
there  is  a  strand  of  literature  which     by  focusing  on  the  ‘opportunity 
perspective’   interprets the level of unemployment as an indicator of ‘social 
inactivity’,  and  posits  a  negative  relationship  between  crime  and 
unemployment. As unemployed are engaged in a reduced number of social 
interactions, their opportunities for delinquency are reduced. In other words 
the ‘opportunity perspective’ maintains that a negative association between 
crime  and  unemployment  is  what  one  should  expect.  Although  such 
interpretation  has  been  proposed  for  both  property  and  violent  crimes 
(Cantor and Land, 1985), some evidence is available only as far as violent 
crime is concerned (e.g. Saridakis 2004; Levitt, 2001; Entorf and Spengler, 
2000,  Britt,  1997).  While  dealing  with  unemployment,  in  particular,  we 
follow the empirical strategy expounded in Allen (1996) and Levitt (2001), 
thus focusing on the one year lagged values of both unemployment rates. 
Eventually,  in  line  with  a  recent  work  by  Fougère  et  al.,  (2009)  we  also 
control for youth unemployment, which is expected to increase crime2. This 
is particularly important in Italy which has traditionally the highest rate of 
youth unemployment among the G7 countries3.  
We also consider GDP per capita as an explanatory variable, as it has 
been proved to be significantly related to crime in the Italian case (Caruso, 
2011; Scorcu and Cellini, 1998; Marselli, 1997). However, GDP per capita 
can have an impact on crime which is not perfectly predictable ex ante. On 
                                                           
2 A related argument focuses on both the frustration and the political violence emerging in 
the presence of growing rates of youth unemployment (Caruso and Schneider, 2011).  
3  For  example  in  2005  the  youth  unemployment  rate  in  Italy  was  24%  while  it  was 
significantly lower in France (20.2%) Germany (15.5%), Japan (8.7%), UK (12.8%), USA 
(11.3%).    12 
 
the  one  hand,  taking  income  per  capita  as  a  measure  of  economic 
opportunities, one can expect that where GDP is higher, opportunities are 
better, hence the tendency to commit crime should be lower. On the other 
hand, where GDP per capita is higher, opportunities for crime are higher, 
especially opportunities for property crime, as an higher level of income will 
lure criminals, impacting positively on crime rates. 
 
Future  economic  opportunities.  Current  economic  opportunities 
might catch only partly the set of incentives related to criminal activities. 
Indeed    one  might  also  indulge  in  crime  when  she  expects  lower  future 
economic  opportunities,  somewhat  anticipating  the  worsening  of  her 
economic  situation.  For  this  reason,  two  variables  proxying  for  future 
economic opportunities have also been introduced in the model: investments 
in  manufacturing  and  patent  intensity.  In  a  productive  (non parasite) 
economy, investments in manufacturing today are indeed supposed to be a 
proxy of economic opportunities tomorrow. Therefore a negative relationship 
between investments in manufacturing and crime is expected. The use of 
this covariate is novel in the literature on crime. The only exception is the 
study  by    Caruso  (2009),  showing  that  a  negative  relationship  between 
investments  in  manufacturing  and  crime  rates  holds  for  the  case  of 
organised crime in Italy.  
As  a  second  measure  of  future  opportunities  we  consider  patent 
intensity.  Where  patent  intensity  is  higher,  the  development  of  new 
products  is  also  higher,  hence  we  expect  better  future  economic 
opportunities and, as before, a negative relationship with crime. 
 
Education.  Another  recurring  feature  of  studies  investigating  the 
determinants  of  crime  concerns  its  relationship  with  education.  The 
established literature highlights a negative correlation between education 
and crime (e.g., Groot and van den Brink, 2010; Dills et al., 2008; Lochner 
and Moretti, 2004; Soares, 2004; Gould et al., 2002; Miron, 2001; Grogger, 
1998), as education is expected to increase the returns of legitimate work 
and business, hence the opportunity costs of committing crime. Moreover, 
education  is  expected  to  have  a  deep  impact  on  behaviour,  as  it  frames 
individuals’ beliefs and preferences. In a sense, more educated people should 
be better able at figuring out future consequences of their actions. Education 
can therefore be viewed either as a proxy for time preferences (we expect 
individuals with a longer time horizon to invest more in education), or as a 
variable which can heavily influence time preferences via its impact on the 
ability of individuals to figure out future scenarios (e.g.,  Borghans et al., 
2008). We experiment with two measures for education: the share of the 
population between 25 and 64 years old holding a high school diploma, and 
the  share  of  the  population  between  20  and  24  years  old  holding  a  high 
school diploma. The two variables capture different cohorts of individuals. 
For the former, diploma was less likely and really be a signal for patience. 
On the contrary, for the latter, diploma is much more common, and those 13 
 
more patient would further improve their education enrolling in a university 
course. 
 
Enforcement efforts. As for the level of law enforcement, we consider 
the current public expenditure in security on a regional basis. The use of 
such a variable is directly suggested by the model presented in Section 2, 
where  the  probability  of  being  detected     which  is  clearly  affected,  as 
discussed  by  Davis  (1988),  by  the  amount  of  resources  available  to  the 
Authorities to enforce legal rules   affects the effective discount rate of each 
agent (see Eq. 3 above). However, one of the recurring issues raised in the 
literature is that any measure of deterrence might be really co determined 
with  crime.  This  can  explain  why,  in  the  empirical  literature,  different 
measures of deterrence are not statistically significant or, quite frequently, 
even positively related to crime (e.g., Benson et al., 1994a,b; Cameron, 1988; 
Devine et al., 1988; Cloninger and Sartorius, 1979; Corman et al., 1987).  
 
Social capital. Finally, we also control for ‘social capital’ which began 
to be investigated in recent literature (Loureiro et al.,2009; Lederman et al., 
2002;  Rosenfeld  et  al.  2001)  .  As  for  Italy,  Buonanno  et  al.  (2009)  study 
whether social capital reduces crime, considering provincial level variations 
in associational networks. They find that a standard deviation increase in 
association density is related, for example, with a reduction in car thefts by 
13  percentage  points.  Here  we  sum  up  social  capital  considering  another 
commonly adopted measure, namely the ratio of volunteers in not for profit 





We  experimented  with  several  different  models  using  a  fixed  effects 
specification  to  control  for  unobserved  heterogeneity  across  regions,  that 
cannot be captured by our covariates. Results are in Tables 1 3 for property 
crime and in Tables 4 6 for violent crime. For both types of crime we first 
estimated a very simple model including our proxies for time preferences 
only,  and  then  augmented  this  baseline  model  by  introducing  those 
variables  that  the  established  literature  indicates  as  important 
determinants of crime. We augment the baseline model by introducing one 
group  of  variables  at  a  time:  current  economic  opportunities;  future 
economic  opportunities;  education;  enforcement  efforts;  social  capital. 
Results are substantially similar for both property and violent crime. The 
main findings of our empirical analysis follow.  
 
The Davis’ hypothesis. First, we find evidence supporting the Davis’ 
hypothesis  that  time  preferences  are  an  important  determinant  of  crime. 
This  evidence  is  particularly  clear  when  time  preferences  are  proxied  by 
either  the  share  of  obese  people  or  the  marriage  rate.    Remarkably,  the 14 
 
coefficient for obesity is always positive and statistically significant in both 
cases of property and violent crime.4 As for the marriage rate, the coefficient 
is always negative and statistically significant in the case of violent crime; 
in  the  case  of  property  crime,  it  is  still  negative  but  turns  insignificant 
whenever the variables capturing the level of education are added to the 
model. Results are less clear cut when using the consumer credit share as a 
proxy for time preferences (see tables 1 and 4 below). In fact, the consumer 
credit share coefficient is both positive and significant only in the baseline 
model (col. I). Its effect turns even negative and statistically significant in 
some  specifications  in  which  education  is  added  to  the  model.  This  is 
probably due to the fact that consumer credit is only partly linked to time 
preferences. 
 
[TABLE 1 AND 4 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Indeed, considering coefficients’ magnitudes, we observe in general that 
adding  to  the  model  extra  covariates  produces  the  effect  of  reducing  the 
coefficients’  size.  This  suggests  that  the  variable  proxying    for  time 
preferences might be affected by other interacting factors, such as per capita  
income or the level of  education. In those cases in which these interacting 
factors are important determinants of the specific variable proxying for time 
preferences, the estimated impact of the latter on crime shrinks, because its 
residual variability is not sufficient to accurately identify the coefficients. 
Notably, this happens for example in the case of consumer credit: we know, 
for instance, that young and well educated people besides poor people use 
this type of credit to finance their consumption (Magri et al., 2011). 
 
Current  economic  opportunities.  Second,  we  observe  that  current 
economic  opportunities  have  a  different  impact  on  property  and  violent 
crime. As far as property crime is concerned, the GDP coefficient is always 
positive and almost always statistically significant in models not controlling 
for the level of education; it turns insignificant when education is used as an 
additional control (see Tables 1 3, col. VI IX). 
 
[TABLES 2 AND 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
This is quite unsurprising, for education and GDP are strictly related 
and they probably tell a quite similar story in relation to crime.  
                                                           
4 One may argue that more obese people are more prone to commit crime, since they have 
fewer opportunities in the labour market than non obese. Evidence on this point is provided 
for  instance  by  Price  (2009).  In  this  case,  our  results  may  simply  be  due  to  a  story  of 
opportunities, and be totally unrelated to time preferences. However, notice that we control 
for unemployment, so that the estimated coefficient for obesity is net of the effect working 
through the labour market, and seems to be a truly ‘time preference’ effect. 15 
 
As far as unemployment is concerned, we find that the coefficient for the 
unemployment rate is never statistically significant, whereas the coefficient 
for  youth  unemployment  is  always  positive  and  statistically  significant. 
Overall  the  evidence  seems  to  indicate  a  negative  effect  of  long term 
unemployment  on  property  crime,  even  if  statistical  significance  strongly 
depends on both the model specification and the variables used to proxy for 
time preferences. Apparently, then, when young generations cannot find a 
job, they are more prone to indulge in property crimes.  
A different story comes up when violent crime is considered. Coefficient 
on  GDP  per  capita  is  positive  and  statistically  significant  in  models  not 
including  any  measure  of    education  among  the  explanatory  variables. 
Controlling  for  education  makes  the  coefficient  associated  to  GDP 
insignificant. Such coefficient moreover turns negative and significant when 
a proxy for social capital is included. This suggests the existence of a strong 
relationship  between  GDP  per  capita  and  measures  of  social  capital,  as 
pointed out by a now well established literature (e.g., Knack  and Keefer, 
1997).  These  results  hold  with  any  of  the  variables  proxying  for  time 
preferences (see Tables 4 6). 
 
[TABLES 5 AND 6 ABOUT HERE] 
 
It  is  worth  mentioning  that,  considering  violent  crime,  the  coefficient 
measuring  the  impact  of  the  unemployment  rate  is  always  negative  and 
statistically  significant  (whereas  coefficients  for  both  long term 
unemployment  and  youth  unemployment  are  never  significant).  These 
results support the ‘opportunity perspective’ discussed above. Remarkably, 
these  results  hold  irrespective  of  the  variables  used  to  proxy  for  time 
preferences. 
 
Future economic opportunities. Third, we find evidence that future 
economic opportunities are negatively correlated with crime. Coefficients on 
both variables measuring future prospects are almost always negative and 
statistically significant. In particular, as far as property crime is concerned, 
the  coefficient  for  patent  intensity  is  always  negative  and  statistically 
significant.  Remarkably,  the  range  within  which  the  coefficient  varies  is 
very narrow, no matter neither the specific variable used to proxy for time 
preference  nor  the  model  specification.    The  coefficient  associated  with 
investment in manufacturing always displays the expected sign, however, it 
is not statistically significant when a measure of social capital is introduced 
(see Tables 1 3).  
The  situation  appears  somewhat  reversed  when  focusing  on  violent 
crime.  In  this  case  patent  intensity  almost  always  does  not  display  a 
statistically  significant  effect  (Tables  4 6),  whereas  investment  in 
manufacturing does.  
 Besides  the  easiest  explanation  working  via  an  ‘income  effect’,  a 
possible  additional  interpretation  for  these  results  is  that  where 16 
 
investments  in  both  manufacturing  and  R&D  are  higher,  people  hold  a 
stronger concern for the future.  
 
Education.  Fourth,  as  for  the  variables  measuring  the  level  of 
education, we find that only the share of the population between 25 and 64 
years old holding a high school diploma matters. In particular, as far as 
property  crime  is  concerned,  the  coefficient  associated  to  this  variable  is 
negative and statistically significant only in models not including a proxy 
for social capital, (see Tables 1 3). Such a coefficient is however negative and 
statistically significant in all models explaining violent crime which consider 
the  share  of  obese  individuals  and  the marriage  rate as  proxies  for  time 
preferences (Tables 5 and 6). On the contrary, the coefficient measuring the 
impact  of  the  variable  High school    20 24  on  crime  is  never  statistically 
significant. The negative association between education (as measured by the 
share of the population between 25 and 64 years old holding an high school 
diploma)  and  crime,  confirms  previous  literature  and  suggests  one  easy 
interpretation: education increases the returns of legitimate work, hence the 
opportunity costs of committing crime. 
 
Enforcement.  Fifth,  consistently  with  the  scientific  literature  on  the 
determinants  of  crime,  we  find  that  the  coefficient  associated  to  public 
expenditure  in  security  is  never  statistically  significant  in  models 
considering  property  crime  (Tables  1 3),  whilst  it  is  almost  always 
insignificant in the case of violent crime (Tables 4 6). Coefficient on security 
turns  out  to  be  positive  and  statistically  significant  only  when  time 
preferences are proxied by consumer credit share in the case of violent crime 
(Table 4). Simultaneity bias is a plausible explanation of this apparently odd 
result, as crime rates clearly influence expenditure in security. 
  
Social Capital. Finally, notice that the coefficient on our proxy of  social 
capital is  consistently  negative  and  statistically  significant  in  all models, 
except  when  time  preferences  are  proxied  by  marriage  rates  in  models 
where violent crime is the dependent variable (Table 6, col. IX). Hence, as 
largely expected, where people volunteer more, crime rates are lower. This 
finding  should  be  thought  more  as  a  correlation  than  as  a  causal  link 
between  the  two  variables,  since  volunteering  and  crime  are  likely  to  be 
determined by some common underlying (cultural) factor, captured by the 
fixed effects included in the model. 
 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
In  this  paper  we  propose  a  first  empirical  test  on  the  relationship 
between  time  preferences  and  crime  using  as  a  sample  the  whole  set  of 
Italian  regions  observed  over  the  period  2002 2007.  We  consider  both 
property and violent crimes. We proxy time preferences employing: 1) the 
amount  of  short term  debt  to  finance  consumption  (the  consumer  credit 17 
 
share); 2) the prevalence of obese people according to their body mass index 
(obesity); 3) the willingness of individuals to engage in stable relationships 
(the marriage rate). In line with the theoretical prediction by Davis (1988), 
we find that where people are more impatient and discount the future more 
heavily,  property  and  violent  crimes  are  higher.  In  particular,  the 
correlation between crime rates and time preferences is especially robust 
when time preferences are proxied both by the obesity and the marriage 
rates. Results are robust even when controlling for variables drawn from the 
established literature on crime. Indeed, additional covariates (like current 
economic opportunities, education, security expenditures and social capital) 
substantially  confirm  the  results  already  available  in  the  literature  on 
crime. A more novel result – emphasising the importance of the future   is 
the  association  between  future  economic  opportunities  and  crime:  where 
future economic prospects are expected to be better, crime rates are lower.  
If  time  preferences  are  consistently  associated  with  crime  rates,  it 
becomes important to understand how these preferences are shaped. One 
possibility  is  to  think  at  these  preferences  quite  deterministically,  as 
fashioned,  for  instance,  by  cognitive  (unobserved)  abilities  and/or  other 
biological  characteristics.  This  is  not  without  consequences,  however. 
Dohmen  et  al.  (2010)  suggest  for  example  that  cognitive  ability  and 
impatience  are  negatively  correlated.  One  may  therefore  think  that 
individuals with reduced cognitive ability are more prone to commit crime.5 
Daly et al. (2009) find that discount rates correlate positively with systolic 
blood pressure. Again, supporters of the deterministic vision would advocate 
that hypertensive individuals are more prone – ceteris paribus   to engage in 
antisocial activities. These ideas are not new. Indeed they imply that the 
propensity to commit crime is biologically determined, an hypothesis very 
close  to  the  one  first  advanced  by  the  Italian  anthropologist  Cesare 
Lombroso, and now firmly rejected on scientific grounds.  
An  alternative  hypothesis  is  that  time  preferences  are  socially 
determined. In other words, they are mostly determined by social processes 
related to the cultural transmission of values and norms. In this sense, our 
analysis  at  a  regional  level  might  properly  catch  the  ‘average’  time 
preferences  of  a  representative  individual  in  a  given  social  context.  How 









                                                           
5 Beraldo (2010) questions the findings of studies using some measure of cognitive ability 
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Table 1. Property crime and consumer credit share (FE  estimates) 
   I  II  III  IV  V  VI  VII  VIII  IX 
Consumer credit share  .344**  .132  .126  .216  .201   .210   .190  .027  .088 
   (.160)  (.189)  (.186)  (.181)  (.177)  (.196)  (.192)  (.228)  (.222) 
GDP per capita (t-1)    1.545**  1.883***  1.341**  1.563**   .351   .048   .816   .553 
    (.775)  (.750)  (.739)  (.714)  (.804)  (.799)  (.828)  (.813) 
Unemployment (t-1)     .002    .038    .036    .028   
    (.056)    (.055)    (.052)    (.053)   
Long-term 
unemployment (t-1)       .053     .068     .075    -.087** 
      (.053)    (.051)    (.048)    (.047) 
Youth unemployment (t-
1)      .091**    .101**    .071*    .072* 
         (.048)     (.046)     (.043)     (.043) 
Investments in 
Manufacturing         -.212***  -.22***   .116  -.129*   .0868   .097 
        (.0860)  (.082)  (.083)  (.079)  (.0847)  (.081) 
Patent intensity        -.068***  -.068***  -.069***  -.068***  -.0735***  -.073*** 
            (.023)  (.0239)  (.0215)  (.0211)  (.0213)  (.021) 
High School 20-24             .0346   .1008   .066   .121 
            (.305)  (.298)  (.305)  (.294) 
High School 25-64            -1.772***  -1.698***   .801   .650 
                  (.426)  (.426)  (.610)  (.600) 
Security                -.765   .405 
                        (1.098)  (1.065) 
Social capital                -3.265**  -3.111** 
                        (1.767)  (1.708) 
Constant  3.357***  -13.15  -16.80**   7.30   11.48  14.565  11.621  22.033**  16.74 
   (.169)  (8.293)  (8.000)  (8.01)  (7.741)  (9.320)  (9.243)  (11.740)  (11.476) 
Obs  120  120  120  120  120  120  120  120  120 
Groups  20  20  20  20  20  20  20  20  20 
R square within  .0444  .0858  .1248  .1938  .2407  .3228  .3537  .3571  .3936 
 R square between  .1809  .5096  .5041  .4645  .4740  .3564  .1465  .2138  .1174 
R square overall  .1604  .4874  .4824  .4469  .4563  .3238  .1165  .2014  .1097 
Notes:  *** significant at 1%, ** significant al 5%, *significant at 10%. For sake of readability statistically significant 





Table 2. Property crime and obesity (FE estimates) 
   I  II  III  IV  V  VI  VII  VIII  IX 
Obesity  .306***  .243***  .262***  .258***  .277***  .176**  .199**  .175*  .184** 
   (.091)  (.095)  (.094)  (.0910)  (.089)  (.0920)  (.0899)  (.101)  (.098) 
GDP per capita (t-1)    1.305**  1.651***  1.254**  1.483***   .553   .226   .803   .470 
    (.687)  (.647)  (.650)  (.608)  (.792)  (.780)  (.793)  (.778) 
Unemployment (t-1)     .002    .030    .045    .024   
    (.054)    (.0532)    (.051)    (.052)   
Long-term 
unemployment (t-1)       .071    -.081*    -.088**    -.087** 
      (.051)    (.049)    (.047)    (.046) 
Youth unemployment (t-
1)      .094**    .106***    .080**    .073* 
         (.046)     (.044)     (.042)     (.042) 
Investments in 
Manufacturing         -.179**  -.194***  -.1345*  -.146**   .105   .117 
        (.083)  (.078)  (.0797)  (.076)  (.084)  (.080) 
Patent intensity        -.072***  -.073***  -.075***  -.074***  -.076***  -.076*** 
            (.0226)  (.022)  (.0213)  (.021)  (.021)  (.0204) 
High School 20-24            .0993  .034  .0311   .011 
            (.30)  (.299)  (.305)  (.294) 
High School 25-64            -1.308***  -1.222***   .665   .618 
                  (.381)  (.381)  (.466)  (.456) 
Security                 1.510   1.175 
                        (1.161)  (1.118) 
Social capital                -3.658**  -3.347** 
                        (1.688)  (1.619) 
Constant  2.303***  -11.303 
-
15.02***   9.310  -11.62**  14.2668  10.964  25.794**  20.147* 
   (.206)  (7.218)  (6.738)  (6.874)  (6.42)  (9.198)  (9.059)  (11.75)  (11 42) 
Obs  120  120  120  120  120  120  120  120  120 
Groups  20  20  20  20  20  20  20  20  20 
R square within  .1018  .1391  .1866  .2456  .3025  .3406  .3798  .3775  .4154 
 R square between  .3576  .5039  .4994  .4624  .4689  .4870  .4452  .2855  .2174 
R square overall  .1650  .4831  .4790  .4460  .4525  .4514  .3989  .2698  .2044 
Notes:  *** significant at 1%, ** significant al 5%, *significant at 10%. For sake of readability statistically significant 





Table 3. Property crime and marriage rate (FE estimates) 
   I  II  III  IV  V  VI  VII  VIII  IX 
Marriage rate  -.594***  -.491***  -.510***  -.478***  -.488***   .241  -.276*   .167   .174 
   (.148)  (.166)  (.164)  (.161)  (.157)  (.170)  (.167)  (.195)  (.1900) 
GDP per capita (t-1)    .941  1.265**  .952  1.180**   .508   .181   .770   .445 
    (.714)  (.678)  (.680)  (.641)  (.799)  (.788)  (.803)  (.7900) 
Unemployment (t-1)    .002    .0301    .041    .024   
    (.053)    (.053)    (.052)    (.053)   
Long-term unemployment 
(t-1)       .071     .077    -.085**    -.085* 
      (.051)    (.048)    (.047)    (.047) 
Youth unemployment (t-1)      .089**    .100***    .076*    .071* 
         (.046)     (.436)     (.043)     (.043) 
Investments in 
Manufacturing         -.157**  -.171**   .125  -.1367*   .092   .102 
        (.0835)  (.0789)  (.081)  (.0768)  (.084)  (.081) 
Patent intensity        -.069*** 
-
.0695***  -.072***  -.071***  -.073***  -.073*** 
            (.0224)  (.0212)  (.021)  (.0209)  (.021)  (.0206) 
High School 20-24             .026   .1007   .077   .125 
            (.304)  (.295)  (.304)  (.293) 
High School 25-64            -1.30***  -1.214***   .741   .700 
                  (.402)  (.402)  (.476)  (.466) 
Security                 1.126   .779 
                        (1.169)  (1.126) 
Social capital                -3.29**  -2.969** 
                        (1.691)  (1.626) 
Constant  3.847***  -6.224  -9.61   5.025   7.272  14.976  11.817  24.043  18.464 
   (.212)  (7.657)  (7.230)  (7.306)  (6.882)  (9.27)  (9.149)  (11.93)  (11.613) 
Obs  120  120  120  120  120  120  120  120  120 
Groups  20  20  20  20  20  20  20  20  20 
R square within  .1573  .1573  .2014  .2512  .3020  .3290  .3658  .3621  .3981 
 R square between  .5333  .5318  .5228  .4895  .4949  .4602  .3895  .2596  .1731 
R square overall  .5125  .5109  .5024  .4738  .4788  .4255  .3444  .2450  .1621 
Notes:  *** significant at 1%, ** significant al 5%, *significant at 10%. For sake of readability statistically significant 







Table 4. Violent crime and consumer credit share (FE estimates) 
   I  II  III  IV  V  VI  VII  VIII  IX 
Consumer credit share  1.211***  .261  .389  .432  .573  -.850**  -.716*  .327  .531 
   (.389)  (.419)  (.447)  (.403)  (.418(  (.401)  (.416)  (.410)  (.426) 
GDP per capita (t-1)    4.231***  5.749***  3.641**  4.686***   1.561   .939  -3.988***  -3.32** 
    (1.720)  (1.800)  (1.649)  (1.690)  (1.648)  (1.734)  (1.502)  (1.558) 
Unemployment (t-1)    -.424***    -.299***    -.298***    -.258***   
    (.124)    (.124)    (.107)    (.096)   
Long-term unemployment 
(t-1)      .056     .034     .041     .128 
      (.126)    (.120)    (1.03)    (.091) 
Youth unemployment (t-1)       .014    .007     .084     .038 
         (.116)     (.108)     (.094)     (.083) 
Investments in 
Manufacturing         -.656***  -.803***  -.373**  -.513***   .165  -.286** 
        (.192)  (.193)  (.170)  (.172)  (.154)  (.155) 
Patent intensity         .034   .038   .038   .041  -.063*  -.065* 
            (.0519)  (.054)  (.0442)  (.046)  (.039)  (.0400) 
High School 20-24            .185  .424  .349  .545 
            (.626)  (.648)  (.553)  (.564) 
High School 25-64            -5.256***  -5.33***   1.413   1.46 
                  (.873)  (.925)  (1.107)  (1.15) 
Security                3.188  4.61** 
                        (1.994)  (2.042) 
Social capital                -6.697**  -5.30* 
                        (3.206)  (3.27) 
Constant  3.935  -40.835 
-
57.69***   29.777  -40.03**  41.40**  35.07*  31.77  15.29 
   (.412)  (18.411)  (19.19)  (17.85)  (18.32)  (19.096)  (20.07)  (21.30)  (22.00) 
Obs  120  120  120  120  120  120  120  120  120 
Groups  20  20  20  20  20  20  20  20  20 
R square within  .0890  .2733  .1874  .3530  .3139  .5416  .5087  .6585  .6405 
 R square between  .0330  .3281  .3491  .3710  .3889  .4468  .4253  .0495  .2021 
R square overall  .0299  .2063  .2155  .2396  .2461  .2330  .2133  .0366  .1363 
Notes:  *** significant at 1%, ** significant al 5%, *significant at 10%. For sake of readability statistically significant 






Table 5. Violent crime and obesity (FE estimates) 
   I  II  III  IV  V  VI  VII  VIII  IX 
Obesity  1.224***  .983***  1.009***  .948***  .968***  .763***  .781***  .505***  .487*** 
   (.206)  (.194)  (.2111)  (.188)  (.197)  (.178)  (.185)  (.179)  (.186) 
GDP per capita (t-1)    2.722**  4.662***  2.602**  4.135***   2.412   1.623  -3.743***  -2.858** 
    (1.400)  (1.452)  (1.339)  (1.352)  (1.540)  (1.607)  (1.407)  (1.479) 
Unemployment (t-1)    -.415***    -.314***    -.260***    -.278***   
    (.110)    (.110)    (.100)    (.092)   
Long-term unemployment 
(t-1)       .013     .082     .0901     .1166 
      (.115)    (.108)    (.0961)    (.087) 
Youth unemployment (t-1)       .001    .023     .0501     .039 
         (.104)     (.097)     (.0875)     (.0799) 
Investments in 
Manufacturing         -.556***  -.717***  -.448***  -.576***   .210  -.331** 
        (.171)  (.174)  (.155)  (.156)  (.149)  (.152) 
Patent intensity         .054   .057   .062   .063  -.068**  -.068* 
            (.046)  (.049)  (.041)  (.043)  (.037)  (.039) 
High School 20-24            .764  .956  .624  .844 
            (.601)  (.617)  (.541)  (.559) 
High School 25-64            -3.314***  -3.50***  -1.462*  -1.903** 
                  (.741)  (.786)  (.826)  (.865) 
Security                .967  2.497 
                        (2.060)  (2.122) 
Social capital                -7.286***  -5.245* 
                        (2.996)  (3.073) 
Constant  -.113***  -27.45* 
-
48.71***   22.048  -37.45  40.015***  32.44  42.14**  23.63 
   (.465)  (14.71)  (15.132)  (14.16)  (14.29)  (17.87)  (18.676)  (20.85)  (21.67) 
Obs  120  120  120  120  120  120  120  120  120 
Groups  20  20  20  20  20  20  20  20  20 
R square within  .2636  .4231  .3384  .4955  .4428  .5984  .5749  .6838  .6600 
 R square between  .0082  .3122  .3415  .3590  .3736  .3730  .3605  .0003  .0502 
R square overall  .0228  .2067  .2156  .2556  .2428  .2006  .1879  .0000  .0391 
Notes:  *** significant at 1%, ** significant al 5%, *significant at 10%. For sake of readability statistically significant 





Table 6.Violent crime and marriage rate 
   I  II  III  IV  V  VI  VII  VIII  IX 








2.096***  -1.551***  -1.541***  -.935***  -.849*** 
   (.302)  (.313)  (.341)  (.309)  (.327)  (.320)  (.334)  (.343)  (.358) 
GDP per capita (t-1)    .8801  2.637**  .952  2.436**   2.37   1.542  -3.58***  -2.71** 
    (1.346)  (1.412)  (1.305)  (1.332)  (1.503)  (1.581)  (1.412)  (1.487) 
Unemployment (t-1)    -.394***    -.315***    -.283***    -.289***   
    (.101)    (.102)    (.097)    (.092)   
Long-term unemployment 
(t-1)       .0266     .079     .087     .113 
      (.106)    (1.007)    (.0946)    (.088) 
Youth unemployment (t-1)       .024     .0025     .060     .046 
         (.096)     (.090)     (.086)     (.080) 
Investments in 
Manufacturing         -.447***  -.605***  -.384***  -.52***   .188  -.311** 
        (.160)  (.164)  (.152)  (.154)  (.148)  (.152) 
Patent intensity         .047   .049   .052   .053   .060   .061 
            (.043)  (.045)  (.040)  (.042)  (.037)  (.039) 
High School 20-24            .241  .4400  .281  .526 
            (.572)  (.593)  (.535)  (.552) 
High School 25-64            -2.779***  -3.01***  -1.391*  -1.881** 
                  (.757)  (.806)  (.837)  (.877) 
Security                1.112  2.762 
                        (2.055)  (2.121) 
Social capital                -6.444***   4.38 
                        (2.973)  (3.062) 
Constant  6.32   2.695  -21.70   .375   15.13  43.260***  35.48  42.691**  23.468 
   (.434)  (14.45)  (15.07)  (14.025)  (14.31)  (17.46)  (18.37)  (20.98)  (21.868) 
Obs  120  120  120  120  120  120  120  120  120 
Groups  20  20  20  20  20  20  20  20  20 
R square within  .4186  .5159  .4405  .5550  .5135  .6163  .5879  .6820  .6558 
 R square between  .1974  .1427  .3000  .1374  .3360  .3906  .3833  .0006  .0777 
R square overall  .0155  .1294  .2006  .1665  .2381  .2089  .1980  .0000  .0598 
Notes:  *** significant at 1%, ** significant al 5%, *significant at 10%. For sake of readability statistically significant 









Table A1. Variables definitions and descriptive statistics 
   Definition   Mean  St. Dev.  Min  Max 
Property Crime rate* 
Number of property crime ( thefts, robberies and burglaries.) per 1000 
inhabitants  2.993  .425  1.816  3.700 
Violent Crime rate* 
Number of violent crime (rapes, homicides, kidnappings, injuries and 
lesions)per  10,000 of inhabitants.  2.654  .363  1.629  3.691 
Consumer Credit Share** 
Ratio between the amount of consumer credit and the total amount of 
loans to households.   1.057  .311   1.966   .528 
Obesity rate  Share of obese people out of the total population (Body Mass Index ≥ 30)  2.260  .150  1.865  2.583 
Marriage rate  Number of marriages per 1.000 individuals  1.434  .128  1.163  1.772 
Unemployment (t-1)*  Unemployment rate.  1.961  .596  .916  3.091 
Youth Unemployment (t-1)* 
Proportion of the youth labour force (persons aged between 15 24) that is 
unemployed.   2.969  .555  1.974  3.873 
Long- term Unemployment (t-1)* 
Proportion of labor force out of work and looking for work for 12 months or 
more  3.667  .419  2.092  4.140 
High School (20-24)* 
Ratio of individuals holding a high school diploma aged 20 24 out of total 
population  4.316  .0861  4.038  4.436 
High School (25-64)* 
Ratio of individuals holding a high school diploma aged 25 64 out of total 
population  3.910  .114  3.621  4.117 
GDP per capita (t-1) *  Gross Domestic Product per capita  10.54  1.089  8.100  12.471 
Investments in Manufacturing            
(t-1)*  Gross Investments in Manufacturing   7.291  1.213  3.833  9.673 
Patent Intensity (t-1)  Patents registered at EPO per 1,000,000 inhabitants  3.513  1.261   1.204  5.233 
Social Capital*  Ratio of volunteers out of the total population  .318  .700   .879  2.257 
Security*  Public expenditure in security   6.694  1.029  4.173  8.266 
Sources: * Italian National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT); ** Bank of Italy. Note: all variables are logged 
 